S.V. Nikolaev1, A.A. Tichonov2, D.S. Merentsov3

1,2 Moscow Aviation Institute (Scientific Research University) branch "Vzlet" (Akhtubinsk, Russia)

3 V.P. Chkalov State Flight Test Center (Akhtubinsk, Russia)

The evaluation of the effectiveness indicators of the combat capabilities of aviation complexes and the evaluation of their combat effectiveness is performed by comparing the obtained characteristics with the specified ones. When performing tasks to destroy air targets, it is customary to consider the probability of victory in an air battle as the main indicator. When determining the probability of victory in an air battle with an enemy fighter, usually, the characteristics of a guided missile, flight characteristics of an aircraft, launch conditions and armament of opposing aircraft are used as initial data.

In modern and promising aviation complexes, the composition of on-board equipment is expanding, the quality of task performance by systems is increasing, computing capabilities are growing intensively, and the algorithms of work are being improved and optimized. The existing approaches to determining the probability of victory in an air battle do not take into account the capabilities of the onboard equipment of modern aircraft to provide protection. These capabilities and the impact of the work of on-board equipment to provide protection during air combat can be represented through the probability of not hitting your aircraft.

This probability depends both on the composition of the on-board equipment that provides protection from the enemy's means of attack, and on the consistency of the on-board equipment systems and the optimality of the algorithms for controlling the operation of these systems.

The means of protection used depend on the type of threat and on the flight parameters. In general, if all the main systems used for defense are on board the aircraft, the probability of non-defeat will be determined as the sum of the conditional probabilities of protection from threats by each system used to counteract a threat of this type.

As an example, the F-35 Lightning II tactical fighter is considered. According to open sources, the F-35 Lightning II fighter can use AN / ASQ-239 Barracuda as sensors in the radar channel when solving defense tasks from the onboard equipment.

The AN/AAQ-37 system is used as sensors in the thermal and optical channels. The system allows you to detect various ground and air targets, warn about a missile attack of an aircraft.

The AN/ASQ-239 system is used as a system that provides counteraction in the radar channel when operating in suppression modes. To provide protection against attacking means operating in the infrared range, false targets are shot, which is performed by the AN/AAQ-37 system.

Thus, the probability of non-detection of an aviation complex by an enemy interception complex using a single guided missile can be determined using conditional probability formulas.

Using this approach, it is possible to determine the probability of protecting an aviation complex during various attacks by enemy aircraft using various guided missiles. The application of the approaches described in the article will allow taking into account the characteristics of on-board equipment when evaluating the probability of victory in air combat.

Nikolaev S.V., Tichonov A.A., Merentsov D.S. Approaches to determining the probability of protecting an aviation complex during air combat. Nonlinear World. 2022. V. 20. № 3. P. 42-50. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18127/j20700970-202203-05
(In Russian)

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