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Journal Neurocomputers №11 for 2015 г.
Article in number:
Neuropragmatism as a justificative stategy of cognitive science
Authors:
M.D. Terekhov - Post-Graduate Student, Chair of Philosophy and Methodology of Science, Philosophy Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University. E-mail: stereodrome@yandex.ru
Abstract:
Cognitive science was initially constructed in a Cartesian way: mind was clearly separated from body and environment. But since 1980-s attempts are made to bind cognitive science with another philosophical tradition. Neuropragmatism compares neuroscience with classical American philosophy of pragmatism, claiming that some its - initial postulates were anticipated by C.S.Pierce and others. The main idea of pragmatism is that we have to consider the consequences of our concepts to achieve correct understanding. Respectively the notion of truth changes itself: true equals useful/effective. The main interconnected topics of pragmatism are naturalism (the philosophical explanation is not metaphysical but starts from everyday and scientific intuitions), empiricism (experience is the source of our theories and beliefs), fallibilism (there-s no absolute foundation for our knowledge) and holism (a whole takes priority over the parts). They may appear as points of proximity with contemporary neuro-/cognitive science. The naturalistic and empirical orientations of the hybrid follow from the mere fact of engagement with neuroscience. C.S.Pierce forestalled the Hebbian ideas and also the idea of neural synchronicity. Fallibilism is easy to be seen in a common place of modern cognitive science to reject the idea of stable representations. Holism may be illustrated by cognitive, social and cultural externalism. It is somewhat likely that neuropragmatism may become a final step to elimination of concepts belonging to folk psychology and old paradigm of cognitive science from the neuroscientific discourse.
Pages: 90-94
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