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Vulnerability of high precision (PPP) GNSS receivers when a spoofer works

DOI 10.18127/j00338486-201909(14)-05

Keywords:

A.Yu. Shatilov – PhD(Eng), Associate Professor, Department of Radiotechnical Systems, National Research University «Moscow Power Engineering Institute»
E-mail: shatilov@srns.ru
V.S. Lukyanov – Post-graduate Student, Department of Radiotechnical Systems, National Research University «Moscow Power Engineering Institute»
E-mail: lukianovvs_work@mail.ru


Today, for various commercial purposes, high-precision navigation equipment is required. But, along with high accuracy, such equipment should have high reliability, including noise immunity. Already there are methods to combat imitation interference. The most effective of them can be called the use of antenna arrays. However, such a solution may be very expensive to buy or not always acceptable for other reasons. Therefore, it is of interest to study the operation of high-precision navigation algorithms themselves under the influence of simulation noise.
In this paper, the Precise Point Positioning (PPP) algorithm is considered as a high-precision navigation algorithm. Compared to the standard navigation algorithm, the PPP algorithm uses third-party information to solve the navigation problem. Such information includes high-precision ephemeris-temporal information, for example, received from a network of stations of the International GNSS Service (IGS).
To obtain a PPP solution, an algorithm provided by Natural Resources Canada was used. This service is quite popular and the algorithm implemented there can be considered a reference.
As a result of the studies, it was demonstrated that the PPP algorithm blocks the solution of the navigation problem if the jammer does not create a navigation field near the receiver’s antenna that is similar to the real navigation field created by GNSS satellites at the retraction point. This indicates a higher PPP interference protection compared to the standard navigation algorithm. But if you create a simulation noise based on a relay of navigation signals, then the PPP algorithm will not be able to detect it.
Also, it was noticed that the PPP algorithm cannot work from a signal simulator. In this case, the signal simulator acts on the PPP algorithm as a hindrance. The solution to the navigation problem in this case will not converge due to the use of third-party ephemeris information in the PPP algorithm that does not correspond to the data that were stored in the signal simulator.

References:
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June 24, 2020
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